BAI: Kz 100,500 ▲ 5.8% | BFA: Kz 118,000 ▲ 138.4% | USD/AOA: 914.60 ▲ 0.2% | Oil (Brent): $74.50 ▲ 3.2% | Gold: $2,920 ▲ 12.1% | BT 91d Yield: 14.8% | Inflation: 15.7% YoY | BNA Rate: 17.5% | BAI: Kz 100,500 ▲ 5.8% | BFA: Kz 118,000 ▲ 138.4% | USD/AOA: 914.60 ▲ 0.2% | Oil (Brent): $74.50 ▲ 3.2% | Gold: $2,920 ▲ 12.1% | BT 91d Yield: 14.8% | Inflation: 15.7% YoY | BNA Rate: 17.5% |

For an economy of $115.2 billion (IMF, December 2025), Angola’s trade profile is remarkably narrow. Crude oil and refined petroleum products constitute over 90% of merchandise exports, a concentration ratio that exceeds even that of other major African oil producers such as Nigeria (~85%) or Equatorial Guinea. This structural dependence means that Angola’s trade balance, current account, fiscal revenues, and foreign exchange reserves all oscillate with Brent crude — a single commodity priced in London determines the external viability of Sub-Saharan Africa’s third-largest economy.

Export Composition

Angola exported an estimated $34-38 billion in merchandise in 2024, with crude oil accounting for $31-35 billion of that total. Production averaged approximately 1.03 million barrels per day (bpd) during 2025, down from the 2008 peak of 1.9 million bpd but sufficient to sustain Angola’s position as Sub-Saharan Africa’s second-largest oil exporter after Nigeria.

The country’s crude blends — Girassol, Dalia, Cabinda, Nemba, Plutonio, and others — trade at premiums or discounts to Brent depending on their API gravity and sulfur content. TotalEnergies operates 35-40% of gross production through deepwater blocks, with Chevron, ExxonMobil, BP, and Eni holding significant concessions. For detailed production data and operator breakdowns, see the Oil & Gas section.

Non-oil exports remain negligible in absolute terms, estimated at $2-3 billion annually. The primary non-oil export categories include:

  • Diamonds. Angola is Africa’s third-largest diamond producer by value, with the state-owned Endiama and its partner De Beers Group operating major kimberlite mines. Diamond exports are estimated at $1.2-1.5 billion annually.
  • Agricultural products. Coffee (once Angola’s largest export before independence), fisheries products, and timber contribute modest volumes but are growing from a low base under government diversification programs.
  • Re-exports and services. Transit trade through the Lobito Corridor and nascent service exports (primarily construction services to neighbouring countries) represent emerging but still minor revenue streams.

Major Trade Partners

Angola’s trade geography reflects the global oil trade’s gravitational pull toward Asian refiners:

PartnerRoleEstimated Share of Trade (2024)
ChinaLargest export destination & bilateral creditor~55-60% of exports
IndiaSecond-largest crude buyer~8-10% of exports
European UnionMixed (exports to Spain, Portugal; imports from Portugal, Germany)~10-12% of total trade
United StatesOil exports (declining), machinery/equipment imports~5-7% of total trade
BrazilFood imports, construction services~3-5% of imports
South AfricaConsumer goods, industrial inputs~3-5% of imports

China is Angola’s most consequential trade partner by a wide margin. Chinese state refiners (Sinopec, CNOOC, PetroChina) purchase the majority of Angola’s crude output, often under long-term off-take agreements linked to the oil-backed loan facilities (linhas de credito com garantia petrolifera) that financed Angola’s post-civil-war reconstruction. The bilateral relationship extends beyond oil: Chinese construction firms built much of Luanda’s modern infrastructure, and Chinese imports — from consumer electronics to construction materials — dominate Angola’s import shelves. The opacity of China-Angola financial arrangements, particularly the outstanding bilateral debt estimated at $17-21 billion, remains a source of analytical uncertainty. See Public Debt for maturity estimates and restructuring analysis.

India has emerged as the second-largest destination for Angolan crude, driven by expanding refining capacity from Reliance Industries and state-owned Indian Oil Corporation. Indian petroleum imports from Angola averaged 200,000-250,000 bpd in 2024-2025.

The European Union maintains a complex trade relationship with Angola. Portugal, the former colonial power, is the largest EU source of imports (foodstuffs, machinery, pharmaceuticals) and hosts the largest Angolan diaspora community. Spain receives significant crude oil volumes. EU trade policy toward Angola operates under the Everything But Arms (EBA) preferential access framework, though Angola’s utilization of EBA preferences for non-oil exports remains minimal.

Import Dependency

Angola imports approximately $15-18 billion in goods annually, creating a structural vulnerability that the government has struggled to address for two decades. The most critical dependency is food: Angola imports an estimated 80% of its food supply, including staples such as rice, wheat, cooking oil, sugar, and frozen poultry. This import bill — estimated at $4-5 billion annually — is particularly burdensome because it is denominated in foreign currency, creating persistent demand for dollars through the BNA’s FX auction system.

Other major import categories include:

  • Capital equipment and machinery. Oil sector equipment, construction machinery, and industrial inputs represent $3-4 billion annually, much of it sourced from the United States, EU, and China.
  • Consumer goods. Vehicles, electronics, textiles, and household goods, primarily from China, South Africa, and Portugal.
  • Pharmaceuticals and medical supplies. A growing import bill reflecting both population growth and the expansion of healthcare infrastructure.

The import structure creates a paradox: Angola earns foreign exchange almost exclusively through oil, then spends a large share of those earnings importing goods that could, in theory, be produced domestically. The disconnect between export earnings and import spending is the central challenge of Angola’s trade policy.

Trade Balance Dynamics

Angola typically runs a merchandise trade surplus, but the magnitude is entirely oil-price dependent. When Brent averages above $70/bbl, the trade surplus is comfortable ($15-20 billion). When Brent falls below $50/bbl — as it did briefly in 2020 — the surplus compresses sharply or disappears entirely, forcing the BNA to draw down reserves and tighten FX access.

The current account balance follows a similar pattern but is typically weaker than the trade balance due to large services account deficits. Foreign oil companies repatriate significant profits (rendimentos de investimento), and Angola imports substantial technical and construction services. The IMF estimates that every $10/bbl decline in Brent erodes the current account by approximately 3-4% of GDP.

PRODESI: Import Substitution Strategy

The Programa de Apoio a Producao, Diversificacao das Exportacoes e Substituicao das Importacoes (PRODESI) is the government’s flagship trade policy initiative, launched in 2018 and updated annually. PRODESI targets the replacement of selected imports — particularly foodstuffs, beverages, construction materials, and light manufactured goods — with domestically produced alternatives.

The program operates through several mechanisms:

  • Tariff protection. Higher import duties on products deemed competitive with domestic output, including certain beverages, cement, and processed foods.
  • Import licensing restrictions. Quotas and licensing requirements for designated product categories, administered through the Ministerio do Comercio (MINCO).
  • Credit lines. Subsidized lending through Banco de Desenvolvimento de Angola (BDA) and commercial banks for import-substituting industrial projects.
  • Export incentive zones. Preferential tax and regulatory treatment in designated Zonas Economicas Especiais (ZEE), particularly the Luanda-Bengo and Viana industrial zones.

Results have been mixed. Cement production has reached near self-sufficiency, and domestic beer production (led by Cuca and Nocal brands) has displaced significant imports. But food import dependency has proven resistant to policy intervention: Angola’s agricultural sector is constrained by poor rural infrastructure, limited mechanization, unresolved land tenure, and the lingering effects of landmines from the 1975-2002 civil war that render an estimated 1,100+ square kilometers of arable land inaccessible.

Port Infrastructure and Logistics

Angola’s trade flows through a port system that has improved substantially since the civil war but remains a bottleneck for both imports and non-oil export development:

Porto de Luanda. The capital’s port handles approximately 70% of imports by value but suffers from chronic congestion, limited container handling capacity, and high dwell times (averaging 15-20 days versus 5-7 days in Durban or Mombasa).

Porto do Lobito. The Atlantic terminus of the Lobito Corridor railway, which connects to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia. The corridor’s rehabilitation — backed by $1.6 billion in commitments from the United States, EU, and AfDB following the 2023 G7 endorsement — could transform Lobito into a major mineral and agricultural export hub for southern-central Africa.

Porto de Cabinda. Primarily serves the oil enclave of Cabinda province and its offshore production zones.

Porto de Namibe. A secondary facility with potential for expansion to serve the southern agricultural regions.

The logistics challenge extends beyond ports. Inland transport relies heavily on road networks that deteriorated during the civil war and have been only partially rebuilt. Rail connectivity is limited to three historic lines (Luanda, Benguela, and Namibe corridors), of which only the Benguela line to Lobito has been fully rehabilitated. These infrastructure constraints add an estimated 20-30% to the cost of goods in interior provinces, suppressing both consumption and agricultural commercialization.

Forward Outlook

Angola’s trade trajectory hinges on two variables: oil prices and diversification execution. The near-term outlook is dominated by Brent crude dynamics — OPEC+ production policy, global demand conditions, and the energy transition’s long-term drag on fossil fuel investment. Diversification through PRODESI, the Lobito Corridor, and agricultural development offers genuine long-term potential but operates on decade-long timelines. For investors, the trade balance remains the single most important indicator of Angola’s external sustainability and, by extension, the kwanza’s stability and the government’s ability to service its external debt obligations.

Export Composition — Oil, Diamonds, LNG

Export Composition — Oil, Diamonds, LNG — data and analysis for Angola's economy.

Feb 23, 2026

Import Composition & Dependency

Import Composition & Dependency — data and analysis for Angola's economy.

Feb 23, 2026

Major Trading Partners — China, India, EU

Major Trading Partners — China, India, EU — data and analysis for Angola's economy.

Feb 23, 2026
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